Abstract We show how a simple but e cient evaluation procedure that is logically correct only for closed-world knowledge bases can nonetheless be used in certain contexts with open-world ones. We discuss two cases, one based on restricting queries to be in a certain normal form, and the other, arising in reasoning about actions, based on having sensing information at the right time so as to dynamically reduce open-word reasoning to closed-word reasoning.
INTRODUCTION
From the very beginnings of AI, the dream of getting a machine to exhibit common sense was linked to deductive reasoning:
We shall therefore say that a program has common sense if it automatically deduces for itself a su ciently wide class of immediate consequences of anything it is told and what it already knows. | John McCarthy in (McCarthy, 1968) Since then, the enthusiasm for deduction has been tempered somewhat by what has been discovered about its computational di culty. Regard-1 less of how one feels about the relevance of complexity and computability theory to AI, for knowledge bases (KBs) large enough to hold what is presumed to be necessary for human-level common sense, deduction would have to be extremely e cient. Recent local search based methods like GSAT (Selman et al., 1992) do show some promise on large KBs, but so far (1) they are restricted to constraint satisfaction tasks not deductive ones, and (2) they work only on problems that can be formulated in a propositional language. 1 To the best of our knowledge, there is so far only one logically correct (sound and complete) deductive technique e cient enough to be feasible on KBs of this size: the deduction underlying database query answering. In KR terms, this amounts to what was called vivid reasoning in (Levesque, 1986) . In logical terms, the requirements for this form of reasoning are clear: every relevant atomic formula must be known to be true or known to be false. That is, the KB must be equivalent to a maximally consistent set of literals. In addition, this set of literals must be readily computable. In the propositional case, one obvious way of ensuring this is to store the positive ones in a database and infer the negative ones using negation as failure. With every atom known true or known false, it then follows that every formula can be \e ciently" (in a sense to be discussed later) determined to be true or to be false by evaluating it, that is, by calculating its truth value as a function of the truth values of its constituent atoms.
But this requirement for complete knowledge is very strict. It would certainly be desirable to allow some atomic formulas to be unknown, with the understanding that other formulas would need to be unknown as well. Allowing arbitrary disjunctions (or existential quanti cations) in the KB would obviously require a very di erent method of reasoning. A less radical move, which still allows incomplete knowledge, is to consider a KB that is equivalent to a nite consistent set of literals, not necessarily maximal. Unfortunately, although this is a trivial extension to the above, we can already see that it will not work: for the special case of a KB equivalent to the empty set of literals, the formulas that would need to be known are precisely the valid ones. Computing these is co-NP hard in the propositional case, and even if we accept the argument that it may still be feasible in practice (perhaps because the query will always be small, or for reasons like those discussed in (Hogg et al., 1996) ), there is no escaping the fact that it would be undecidable in the rst-order case.
So it appears that even a seemingly insigni cant increase in expressive power, allowing for the most basic form of incompleteness in the KB, already makes deduction too hard. Despite this, it is precisely this form of incomplete knowledge that we will consider in this paper, suitably generalized to deal with quanti ers and equality. We refer to the sort of reasoning required as open-world reasoning, to distinguish it from closedworld reasoning where every formula is known to be true or known to be false on the one hand, and fully general reasoning, which allows for the presence of disjunctions, existentials etc., on the other. 2 What we will argue is that open-world reasoning is a middle ground that can be dealt with e ectively (sometimes) using two complementary approaches:
by restricting the class of queries to a special normal form (NF), a simple evaluation procedure provides inference that is both logically sound and complete; by assuming that we have sensing information, i.e., information coming from outside the system, available at the right time, we can reduce an otherwise open-world reasoning problem to a closedworld one, and again use the simple evaluation procedure. Here we describe the two approaches and state the main theorems without proof. Further technical details on the two approaches can be found in (Levesque, 1998) and (De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999) respectively.
EVALUATION-BASED REASONING
The reasoning procedure we have in mind (for KBs with both complete and incomplete knowledge) is one that decides whether a formula is true or false by evaluating it, reducing knowledge of complex formulas to knowledge of the ground atomic formulas, A. 3 Throughout, we will use 0 to mean \known to be false," 1 to mean \known to be true," and 1 2 to mean \unknown." 4 Given an assignment V 2 A ! f0; 1; 1 2 g] telling us which atoms are known, we extend the assignment to all boolean formulas in the obvious way: f is logically correct wrt S for T i it is both sound and complete.
We will see below (after we establish some properties of quanti ers and equality) that whenever we begin with an evaluation function that is logically sound for atomic formulas, it will end up logically sound for all formulas. But this will not be the case for logical completeness: it is a well known property of multi-valued logics (Urquhart, 1986) 2 . Moreover, the formula here is in CNF, and there are no hidden tautologous clauses to remove. 5 However, observe that the clause (:q _ r) is derivable from these two by Resolution, and if we were to conjoin this new clause to the formula, logical equivalence would be preserved and V would now return the correct answer, 0. This is the idea behind the normal form we will introduce later.
A few words on the e ciency of the above treatment of knowledge.
If the query does not use quanti ers, V will ask for the value of an atom a linear (in the size of the query) number of times. So nonquanti ed queries are handled e ciently, assuming atoms are. But for quanti ed queries, the situation is less clear. Consider one like 9x 1 9x n ( 1^ ^ m ); where the j are atoms whose arguments are among the x i . Even if we imagine a KB that is a simple database (a nite set of ground atoms) that uses k constants, the obvious way of handling this requires looking at all k n vectors of constants, clearly infeasible for the sort of large k we are considering. 6 In actual database systems, queries like this can be formulated, but they are handled in practice using a number of optimizations such as sort restrictions on variables (so that not all constants need be considered for every variable), and sophisticated implementations of relational operations (e.g, join, selections) and careful subgoal (join) ordering and selection placement. These types of optimizations will be available to us as well, and coupled with an assumption that n is very small, we take it that quanti ed queries can be handled e ciently (or as e ciently as can be expected), assuming again that atomic queries are.
3.
A FIRST APPROACH
The rst approach which will allow us to use the above evaluation procedure requires queries to be in a certain normal form. But rst we must be clear about the sorts of KBs we will be using. For the purposes of this section, we start with a standard rst-order language L with no function symbols other than constants and a distinguished equality predicate. We assume a countably in nite set of constants C = fc 1 ; c 2 ; : : :g for which we will be making a unique-name assumption.
QUANTIFIERS AND EQUALITY
Because we will be considering KBs and queries that use equality, we will end up wanting to compute the entailments not just of the KB, but of E KB, where we have: De nition 2 The set E is the axioms of equality (re exitivity, symmetry, transitivity, substitution of equals for equals) and the (in nite) set of formulas f(c i 6 = c j ) j i 6 = jg.
Note that because we are making a unique-name assumption for innitely many constants, we will not be able to nitely \propositionalize" rst-order KBs, despite the lack of function symbols. We will use to range over substitutions of all variables by constants, and write as the result of applying the substitutions to . We will use to range over atoms (other than equalities) whose arguments are distinct variables, so that ranges over ground atoms. We will use 8 to mean the universal closure of . When S is nite,^S stands for the conjunction of its elements (and the logical constant TRUE, when S is empty). Finally, we will use e to range over ew s, by which we mean quanti er-free formulas whose only predicate is equality.
Before discussing KBs and queries, we need to establish how the quanti ers and substitution behave. First we de ne the notion of a standard interpretation:
De nition 3 A standard interpretation of L is one where = is interpreted as identity, and the denotation relation between C and the domain of discourse is bijective. We get the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Suppose S is any set of closed w s, and that there is an in nite set of constants that do not appear in S. Then E S is satis able i it has a standard model. This is like Herbrand's Theorem (with C being like the Herbrand Universe) except that S is not required to be in prenex form, can contain arbitrary alternations of quanti ers (which would otherwise introduce Skolem functions), etc. Note that this is not simply a variant of the Skolem-Lowenheim Theorem either, since our theorem does not hold when S mentions every constant, as in the set f9x:P(x)g f:P(c) j c 2 Cg: This is an example of a satis able set that has no standard model.
The second theorem concerns substitutions by constants:
Theorem 2 Let S be a set of closed w s, let be a w with a single free variable x, and let H + be a set of constants containing those in S, those in , and at least one constant in neither. Then for every constant d 2 C, there is a constant c 2 H + such that E S j = x d i E S j = x c :
It is this theorem that will allow us to restrict our attention a nite set of constants in H + when we do substitutions, as we will show below. Note that the theorem is false if H + contains just the constants in S and .
For example, let be P(x), and S be f8z(z 6 = a P(z))g. In this case, the only constant in S or is a, and E S j 6 = x a , but E S j = x b . The theorem is also false if H + does not contain the constants in . For example, let be R(x; b), and S be f8y:8z:(y = z) R(y; z)g: Here, E S j = x b , but for every other constant c, E S j 6 = x c .
KNOWLEDGE BASES
Since we are considering a KB containing equality, variables, and universal quanti ers, we will not be able to do simple retrieval to nd out what is known about the atoms. For example, let be the formula 8x8y8z:(x 6 = y^z = y) R(x; z; y):
If a KB contains then we want R(b; a; a) to be known. So we must rst be clear about the form of KB we will be using:
De nition 4 We call a set S of formulas proper if E S is consistent and S is a nite set of formulas of the form 8(e ) or 8(e : ), where e is an ew , and is an atom as above.
We will be interested in KBs that are proper. Observe that as a special case, we can represent any nite consistent set of literals as a proper KB: simply replace (or its complement) by 8(e ) where e is of the form^(x i = c i ). We can also represent a variety of in nite sets of literals, as the formula does above. We are free to characterize some of the positive instances of by using 8(e ) , and leave the status of the rest open. We can do the same for negative instances. We can also make a closed world assumption about a predicate if we so choose, by using both 8(e ) and 8(:e : ), for some e and .
It might appear that proper KBs are overly restrictive, and ought to be easy to reason with. It is worth remembering that deciding whether a proper KB entails a formula is recursively unsolvable, unless the formula is restricted in some way, as we intend to do.
Although proper sets are not the same as sets of literals, they can be used to represent them in the following way:
De nition 5 Let S be any nite set of 8(e ) formulas as above, but not necessarily consistent. De ne Lits(S) = f j 8(e ) 2 S; E j = e g:
Then we get the following: Theorem 3 Let S be a nite set of formulas of the above form, and let M be any standard interpretation. Then M j = S i M j = Lits(S) So S and Lits(S) are satis ed by the same standard interpretations (although there will be non-standard interpretations where they diverge).
ATOMIC QUERIES
Now we want to de ne how atomic queries will be handled for proper
KBs. We will use the fact that V has already been de ned for closed ew s, and (by a simple induction argument) satis es the following:
Lemma 4 For any ew e, V e ] = 1 i E j = e .
This establishes that V is logically correct for ew s.
De nition 6 For any proper KB, the atomic evaluation associated with KB is the function V where the H (for handling quanti ers) is the set of constants mentioned in KB, and such that for any ground atom Furthermore, the function (as a procedure) runs in time that is no worse than linear in the size of the KB. Given the considerations discussed in the previous section, this settles the e ciency question as far as we are concerned: using the evaluation V associated with a KB, arbitrary closed queries can be answered e ciently.
We now turn to the correctness of V .
SOUNDNESS OF QUERY EVALUATION
We begin by showing that the evaluation associated with a KB always returns logically correct answers for atomic queries.
Theorem 5 For any proper KB, the evaluation associated with KB is logically correct for ground atomic queries wrt E KB.
Next we show that the evaluation associated with a proper KB always returns logically sound answers for any query:
Theorem 6 Suppose KB is proper. Then the evaluation associated with KB is logically sound for any closed formula wrt E KB.
However, as we already argued, we cannot expect to have logical correctness when knowledge is incomplete. In the next section, we show that we do get it for the special case of queries in normal form.
NORMAL FORM
This is the normal form we will be using:
De This theorem shows that as long as the query is in normal form, we have an \e cient" deductive reasoning procedure for rst-order KBs with incomplete knowledge that is guaranteed to be logically correct. In other words, we can evaluate a query to determine if it or its negation is entailed, and always get answers that are logically correct. Moreover, we can prove that in the propositional sublanguage, the restriction to normal form is without loss of expressive power: (Blake, 1938) . Using later terminology (due to Quine), it is the conjunction of the non-tautologous prime implicates of . Note, however, that while NF includes BCF, it goes beyond it, in that it is closed under negation and has formulas of arbitrary alternations of^and _. As a very simple example, suppose that and are in BCF and share no atoms. Then it is easy to show that f: ; : g is logically separable, and so ( _ ) 2 NF.
We have as yet been unable to prove or disprove that every rst-order formula has an equivalent normal form variant. However, it is useful to consider some special cases guaranteed to be in normal form. For example, we have Theorem 9 If S is proper, then^S 2 NF.
Another special case is as follows:
De nition 9 Two literals are con ict-free i either they have the same polarity, or they use di erent predicates, or they use di erent constants at some argument position.
Theorem 10 If all the literals in are con ict-free, then 2 NF. 7 Roughly speaking, this means that if we have a query where nothing can be inferred using the query alone (because none of its literals con ict), then we can use the evaluation procedure. As a further special case, if we have a query where every predicate letter appears only positively or only negatively, we are guaranteed to be in normal form, and so to get logically correct answers.
4.
A SECOND APPROACH
The second approach to open-world reasoning which will allow us to use the evaluation procedure of Section 2 requires sensing, i.e., getting knowledge from outside the system, to ll in details about otherwise unknown atoms. This approach is most meaningful in a context where we are reasoning about actions and their e ects.
PROJECTION
One of the most fundamental tasks concerned with reasoning about actions is the projection task: determining whether a uent 8 does or does not hold after performing a sequence of actions. In the usual formulation, we are given a characterization of the initial state of the world and some sort of speci cation of what each action does. The projection task requires us to determine the cumulative e ects (and non-e ects) of sequences of actions.
Projection is clearly a prerequisite to planning: we cannot gure out if a given goal is achieved by a sequence of actions if we cannot determine what holds after doing the sequence. Similarly, the high-level program execution task (Levesque et al., 1997) , which is that of nding a sequence of actions constituting a legal execution of a high-level program, also requires projection: to execute a program like \while there is a block on the table, pick up a block and put it away," one needs to be able to determine after various sequences of actions if there is still a block on the table. For these reasons being able to solve the projection problem e ciently is a clear desiderata.
Reiter (Reiter, 1991) proposed action theories of a very special form in the language of the situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969) . Such theories, called basic action theories, have a notable characteristic that allows us to base projection on special form of evaluation (regression) plus inference about the initial situation. This allows for a very e cient way of reasoning when we have complete information about the initial situation. Reiter's basic action theories are the starting point of our discussion.
BASIC ACTION THEORIES
The basic action theories account of action and change is formulated in the language of the situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; Reiter, 2000 ). We will not go over the language here except to note the following components: there is a special constant S 0 used to denote the initial situation, namely the one in which no actions have yet occurred; there is a distinguished binary function symbol do where do(a; s) denotes the successor situation to s resulting from performing action a; relations whose truth values vary from situation to situation, are called (relational) uents, and are denoted by predicate symbols taking a situation term as their last argument; and there is a special predicate Poss(a; s) used to state that action a is executable in situation s:
Within this language, we can formulate action theories that describe how the world changes as the result of the available actions. In particular, basic action theories have the following form (Reiter, 1991) (Reiter, 1991) . We will focus mainly on successor state axioms in the following. states that an object x is broken after doing action a if a is dropping it and x is fragile, a is exploding a bomb near it, or it was already broken, and a is not the action of repairing it.
In this setting the projection problem amounts to checking if
where is the basic action theory describing the domain of interest,
A is a sequence of actions to perform, do(Ã; S 0 ) is the situation that results from performing the sequence of actionsÃ starting in the initial situation S 0 , and is a formula with a single situation term, a free variable ranging over situations. If the logical implication holds then we know that holds after performingÃ starting from S 0 .
The special form of the successor state axioms allows us to regress uents in the sense that whether or not they hold after performing an Regression procedure for basic action theories action can be determined by considering the action in question and what was true just before. By applying regression steps several times, we can regress each uent in a formula all the way back to the initial situation. Intuitively we just have to use the regression procedure sketched in Figure 1 .1 (see (Reiter, 1991) for the formal de nition of regression).
Observe that in the procedure, we use the pseudo-instruction assume S is do(A; S 0 ); to make explicit the form of S, similarly for the SSA.
Observe also that we do not instantiate the situation argument in . It is the variable S that keeps track of the current situation. The formula returned is then to be evaluated in the initial situation, by substituting S 0 as the situation argument. For a formal de nition of regression see (Reiter, 1991) . Note that using regression we are able to reduce a projection problem e ciently to an inference to be done in the initial situation. Now if we have complete information about the initial situation, then we just have to evaluate the formula obtained (using a variant of the procedure in Section 2) instead of making use of full logical inference. In other words, by using regression and making a closed-world assumption about the initial situation we get an e cient evaluation procedure for the entire projection task.
Of course, without this closed-world assumption, we cannot use evaluation (unless we restrict queries as we did in Section 3). In addition, basic action theories, by adopting this form of successor state axioms, also require a strong completeness assumption: after specifying the (perhaps conditional) e ects of the given actions on uents, and then allowing for possible rami cations of these actions (e.g., (Lin and Reiter, 1994) ), it is then assumed that a uent changes only if it has been a ected in one of these ways. What is not allowed, in other words, are cases where the value of a uent does not depend only on the previous situation. This can arise in at least two ways. First, a uent might change as the result of an action that is exogenous to the system. If a robot opens a door in a building, then when nobody else is around, it is justi ed in concluding that the door remains open until the robot closes it. But in a building with other occupants, doors will be opened and closed unpredictably. Secondly, the robot might have incomplete knowledge of the uent in question. For example, a robot normally would not be able to infer the current temperature outdoors, since this is the result of a large number of unknown events and properties.
In cases such as these, the only way we can expect a robot to be able to perform the projection task for arbitrary queries using evaluation is if it has some sensing capabilities in order to determine the current value of certain uents in the world. In (Levesque, 1996) , sensing is modeled as an action performed by a robot that returns a binary measurement. The robot then uses so-called sensed uent axioms to correlate the value returned with the state of various uents. However, in this account, no attempt is made to be precise about the exact relation between sensing and regression. Moreover, there is no possibility of saying when regression should be used, and when sensing should be used.
In (De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999) a formal speci cation of a changing world is proposed which generalizes Reiter's solution to the frame problem to allow conditional successor state axioms, and generalizes the treatment of sensors by Levesque and others (e.g., (Baral and Son, 1997; Golden and Weld, 1996; Poole, 1995; Weld et al., 1998) ) to allow conditional sensing axioms. The speci cation is su ciently general that in some cases, there is simply not enough information to perform the projection task even with sensing. However, in many cases, it allows for solving projection e ciently, by using an evaluation procedure that combines sensing and regression. In the following, we analyze such a proposal in greater detail.
GUARDED ACTION THEORIES
We assume that a robot has a number of onboard sensors that provide sensing readings at any time. Formally, we introduce a nite number of sensing functions, which are unary functions whose only argument is a situation. For example, thermometer(s), sonar(s), depthGauge(s), might all be real-valued sensing functions. 10 We then de ne a sensor-uent formula to be a formula of the language (without Poss, for simplicity) that uses at most one situation term, which is a variable, and that this term only appears as the nal argument of a uent or sensor function. We write (x; s) when is a sensoruent formula with free variables among thex and s, and (t; t s ) for the formula that results after the substitution ofx by the vector of termst and s by the situation term t s . A uent formula is one that mentions no sensor functions. A sensor formula is a sensor-uent formula that mentions sensor function, but does not mention uents, and is assumed to be easily evaluable given the values of the sensors. A guarded action theory is like a basic action theory except that for each uent, instead of a single successor state axiom, it contains any number of guarded successor state axioms and guarded sensed uent axioms.
A guarded successor state axiom (GSSA) is a formula of the form (x; a; s) F(x; do(a; s)) (x; a; s)]
where is a sensor-uent formula called the guard of the axiom, F is a relational uent, and is a uent formula.
A guarded sensed uent axiom (GSFA) is a formula of the form
where is a sensor-uent formula called the guard of the axiom, F is a relational uent, and is a sensor formula.
The following examples show what a guarded action theories can express. Example 12 The outdoor temperature is unpredictable from state to state. However, when the robot is outdoors, its onboard thermometer measures that temperature.
Outdoors (s) OutdoorTemp(n; s) thermometer(s) = n Note that when the guard is false, i.e., when the robot is indoors, nothing can be concluded regarding the outdoor temperature.
Example 13 The indoor temperature is constant when the climate control is active, and otherwise unpredictable. However, when the robot is indoors, its onboard thermometer measures that temperature: Indoors(s) IndoorTemp(n; s) thermometer(s) = n ClimateControl(s) IndoorTemp(n; do(a; s)) IndoorTemp(n; s)
Note that in this case, if the climate control remains active, then a robot that goes rst indoors and then outdoors will still be able to infer the current indoor temperature using both sensing and regressing. One intriguing possibility o ered by this example is that on closing a door, and later coming back in front of the door to nd it open, a security guard robot would be able to infer that :Alone.
Observe that guarded action theories are indeed an extension of basic action theories. We can handle a universally applicable successor state axiom like the one for Broken above by using the guard TRUE. Similarly, we can handle the case where nothing is known either about how to regress a uent or how to sense its value (or both) by dropping GSSAs and GSFAs for the uent all together.
Histories and the projection task.
Once sensors are introduced, to determine if a uent holds at some point, it is no longer su cient to know the actions that have occurred; we also need to know the readings of the sensors along the way (i.e., initially, and after each action). Consequently, we de ne a history as a sequence of the form where i is the subhistory up to action i, (~ 0 That is although the robot is outdoors and hence cannot sense the temperature, it can infer that the temperature indoors is still 19 o , since at one point in the history it was indoors and turned on the climate control when the temperature it was sensing was 19 o , and the climate control remains on, keeping the indoor temperature constant.
GENERALIZED REGRESSION
In principle, the projection task as formulated can be solved using a general rst-order theorem-prover. But our goal here is to keep the logical framework, but show that in common cases projection can be reduced using some form of regression plus inference about the initial situation, as done for basic action theories. In (De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999) Regression procedure for generalized action theories syntactic transformations and logical inference is proposed. Speci cally, logical inference is required only in evaluating the guards to decide which GSFAs and GSSAs to apply. This implies that the regression technique proposed is e ective in cases where the guards are easily evaluable. One can get an intuitive idea of how generalized regression works by looking at the nondeterministic procedure sketched in Figure 1 .2, where is a guarded action theory, is a history, is a sensor-uent formula, and the notation n stands for formula that results from replacing every sensor function h j (s) in by the j-th component of the nal sensor reading in . Observe that the procedure never instantiates the situation argument. It is the history that keeps track of current situation (i.e., end ]). For a more formal de nition of generalized regression, see (De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999) . Generalized regression is always sound, so to perform the projection task, it is su cient to regress the formula and check whether the regressed formula holds in the initial situation. Unfortunately, regression in general cannot be complete. To see why, suppose nothing is known about uent F; then a formula like (F(s) _ :F(s)) will not regress even though it will be entailed by any history.
The other drawback of generalized regression is that we need to evaluate guards. However, evaluating a guard is just a sub-projection task, and so for certain \well structured" action theories, in which guards of the GSFAs for a uent F do not depend circularly on F itself, we can again apply regression. Such theories are called acyclic generalized action theories.
JIT-HISTORIES
As noted above, we cannot expect to use generalized regression to evaluate sensor-uent formulas in general: a tautology might be entailed even though nothing is entailed about the component uents. However, in a practical setting, we can imagine never asking the robot to evaluate a formula unless the history is such that it knows enough about the component uents, using the given GSSAs and GSFAs, and their component uents. In general, we call a history just-in-time (JIT) for a formula, if the actions and sensing readings it contains are enough to guarantee that suitable formulas (including guards) can be evaluated at appropriate points to determine the truth value of all the uents in the formula (see (De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999) It is easy to see that is a JIT history for IndoorTemp(19 o ; end ] ).
Indeed at the end of the climate control is on, so we know that the indoors temperature is as it was in the previous situation. Thus we can regress the formula until we arrive to a point in the history where the robot was indoors, where the sensor readings measured the indoor temperature and the climate control is on. Observe that we do not need to require the robot to know whether the climate control was on before then, or even whether the robot is indoors now.
Although guarded action theories are assumed to be open-world, a JIT-history provides a sort of dynamic closed world assumption in that it ensures that the truth value of any uent will be known whenever it is part of a formula whose truth value we need to determine. This allows us to evaluate complex formulas as we would if we had a normal closed world assumption, again using a variant of the procedure in Section 2 In (De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999) a procedure that evaluates a formula by generalized regression exploiting the notion of JIT-histories is presented.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown how a simple but e cient evaluation procedure that is logically correct only for closed-world knowledge bases could nonetheless be used in certain contexts with open-world ones. In the rst case, we restrict queries to be in a certain normal form which, we conjecture, is without loss of expressive power; in the second case, we restrict queries to be for JIT-histories, where enough sensing information has been acquired to determine the truth values of the uents in the query. For further discussion and directions for future work, see (Levesque, 1998) and (De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999) . Notes 10.Syntactically, these look like functional uents, so to avoid confusion, we only deal with relational uents in this paper.
11.Obviously interesting histories have to satisfy certain legality criteria such as consistency of Sensed ] and conformance to Poss.
